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INTRODUCTION
As of 2019, approximately 15 million children in the United States reside in households
that have incomes below the federal poverty level (NCCP, 2019). This means that 1 in every 6
children in the United States is experiencing poverty (Children's Defense Fund, 2019).
Psychological research demonstrates poverty has a wide range of negative effects on a
child’s well-being and life (APA, 2020). Experiencing poverty can lead to “toxic stress,” which
will have lifelong impacts on physical health and linguistic, cognitive, and socio-emotional
skills, as stated by the American Academy of Pediatrics (American Academy of Pediatrics,
2016). Consequently, children in poverty will face challenges in all aspects of their lives,
including at home, in school, and their communities (APA, 2020).
Economists estimate child poverty costs roughly $1.0298 trillion a year, representing
5.4% of the gross domestic product. This is because child poverty reduces economic
productivity, increase health and crime costs, and requires additional costs related to child
homelessness and maltreatment (Mclaughlin, and Rank, 2018).
One way the federal government attempts to alleviate child poverty and the associated
trauma and expenses is through welfare. Cash assistance helps families make ends meet and
maintain stability, reducing poverty and its effects. The Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families program (TANF) is one source of welfare in the United States. In 2018, TANF assisted
roughly 1.7 million children a month, on average (ACF, 2019). According to the Center on
Budget and Policy Priorities, the state in which a child lives matters, as TANF’s reach varies
considerably across the U.S. As an illustration of the extent of such disparities, one state reached

4 families for every 100 families with children in poverty, while another state assisted 66
families for every 100 families with children in poverty (Floyd, 2020).
Child poverty is a problem found throughout America, and its effects are severe
regardless of where a child lives. It is crucial that all families with children in need have access
to assistance. Furthermore, what state a child lives in should not affect their chances of getting
the help they need. The purpose of this thesis is to understand why some states reach more needy
families than other states and to suggest policy recommendations to help TANF’s reach be more
consistent across states.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Overview of TANF
TANF, primarily known as welfare, is a United States federal assistance program. The
program helps families with children living in poverty make ends meet (OFA, 2019). TANF was
enacted in 1996 by the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
(PRWORA). PRWORA became law to “end welfare as we know it.” The act replaced the Aid to
Families with Dependent Children program (AFDC) with TANF in an attempt to reduce the
number of welfare recipients by redirecting them into the workforce (ASPE, 2016).
TANF imposed new work requirements on recipients and time limitations on receiving
benefits that AFDC did not have. In addition, the successor program changed into a block grant
structure, allowing states to run the program with the help of federal grants. With this new
financing structure came the option of allocating a portion of the funds on noncash assistance,
such as support services (ASPE, 2016).

As a result of the welfare reform, the programs reach declined significantly over the last
few decades. AFDC once reached 68 families for every 100 families with children in poverty,
whereas, TANF now only reaches 22 families for every 100 families with children in poverty.
The graph below demonstrates the decline in TANFs cash assistance reach (Floyd, 2020).
FIGURE 1

Source: CBPP analysis of poverty data from the Census’ Current Population Survey and AFDC/TANF
caseload data from the Department of Health and Human Services caseload data collected by CBPP from
state agencies. https://www.cbpp.org/tanfs-reach-declined-significantly-over-time-1

Despite the overall decline, some states still reach a good portion of those who need
assistance, such as California who reaches 66 families for every 100 families with children in
poverty. On the other hand, some states reach a significantly low portion of those who need help,
such as Texas who only reaches 4 families for every 100 families with children in poverty
(Floyd, 2020).
To examine the number of needy families that have access to TANF benefits in each
state, the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities uses the TANF-to-poverty ratio (TPR). The

CBPP calculates the ratio by dividing the amount of TANF cash assistance recipients by the
number of families with children in poverty. The graph below reveals the TPRs for every state
for 2018 (Floyd, 2020).
FIGURE 2

Source: https://www.cbpp.org/tanfs-reach-declined-significantly-over-time-1

State TANF Policies
The federal government provides grants to states so they can administer the TANF
program (Benefits, 2019). This allows states to determine the polices, such as who will receive
benefits, how much they will get, and under what conditions (Weaver, and Gais, 2016). As a
result, some residents may find it easier to apply, qualify, and maintain eligibility for TANF
benefits.
The Welfare Rules Databook (WRD) discusses TANF policies at length and
demonstrates how they vary considerably across the U.S (Goehring, Benjamin, Minton,

Giannarelli, 2018). According to the WRD, there are over 32 categories of tests for initial
eligibility amongst the states (Goehring et al, 2018). The WRD summarizes these tests into five
sections.
The first section discusses the policy of whether a state tries to divert applicants. Some
states choose to offer formal diversion programs that attempt to redirect individuals from
receiving monthly benefits by offering a lump-sum cash payment option. Furthermore, some of
those states require individuals to enroll in diversion programs before applying for TANF
benefits (Goehring, et al, 2018).
The second section discusses policies relating to family composition. For example, the
federal government requires families to have a dependent but allows the state to determine who
qualifies as a child (Falk, 2017). Some states allow pregnant women with no children to qualify,
whereas, other states require the child to be born before applying for TANF benefits. In addition,
some states allow TANF for children living with caretakers that are not relatives, whereas others
do not. Furthermore, states vary in whether they allow TANF to families with two non-disabled
parents (Goehring, et al, 2018).
Another initial eligibility policy WRD mentions is the asset limit test. This policy allows
states to determine the maximum amount of assets a family can have and still qualify. In
addition, states can choose whether families can exclude some or all the value of a vehicle they
own when calculating total asset value. State’s asset limits vary considerably, ranging from
$1,000 to $10,000 (Goehring, et al, 2018).
The next area WRD discusses is how income is calculated for eligibility purposes. States
have discretion in determining what income counts, and whose income counts from the family.

In general, most states count both earned and unearned income for those considered part of the
family unit. States also have the option of including income from members not of the household,
such as nonparent caretakers and immigrant parents (Goehring, et al, 2018).
WRD also highlights the income eligibility tests used by most states. There are different
methods used to calculate income including a gross income test, a gross earnings test, an
unearned income test, and a net income test. Each state can choose either one of the previous
tests or a combination of them to determine eligibility based on income. The maximum monthly
earning a family can earn varies considerably across states. For example, families of three can
earn up to $286 in Alabama, whereas, Minnesota allows a family to earn up to $2,227 and still be
eligible (Goehring, et al, 2018).
Once a family qualifies for TANF, states have the freedom to determine the level of
benefits they will receive. Each state predetermines a maximum monthly benefit a family can
earn, depending on the size of the family. The average maximum monthly benefit a family of
three can receive a month is $462. The state with the highest maximum is New Hampshire,
allowing a family of three to receive $1,039 a month. On the other hand, Mississippi only allows
a family of three to receive up to $170 a month (Goehring, et al, 2018).
Finally, once a family begins to receive TANF benefits, there are additional requirements
to remain eligible for assistance. Similar to initial eligibility policies, each state determines the
combination of tests used to determine if the family remains eligible. To provide an example
some states set school requirements for the qualifying children. The majority of states require
qualifying children to be enrolled in school full time unless of course, they are not old enough to
be enrolled. Furthermore, some states require parents to keep up with children’s immunization
records, otherwise, they may jeopardize their benefits (Goehring, et al, 2018).

States & Welfare
Welfare reform gave states more flexibility on how they can spend federal grants
(Kruglaya, 2018). Prior to the reform, they were required to provide needy families with cash
assistance. Now, however, they are not required to give just cash assistance, as they can also
spend some of the money on support programs, such as child-care (OFA, 2019). Understanding
how a state views welfare may provide insight on how they allocate TANF funds.
One way to discern a state’s view on welfare is its overall political affiliation. One of the
major differences between a Democrat and Republican is their views on social programs.
Democrats typically believe it is the government’s job to assist the vulnerable members in
society, whereas Republicans believe the government should focus on things like security and
defense (Guidoni, 2019). According to an article on economic demographics of democrats,
“There is a 35-point difference between Democrats and Republicans, with Democrats far more
likely to support government assistance programs” (Fay, 2020, p.5). Therefore, democratic states
are more likely to favor welfare than republican states.
States’ views on welfare may also be reflected in whether they offer other forms of cash
assistance. Another way the federal government provides cash assistance is through refundable
tax credits. Tax credits reduce the total amount of federal income taxes an individual owes.
Unlike deductions, tax credits are dollar-for-dollar reductions of an individual's tax liability and
are not dependent on one’s effective tax rate (Backman, 2018). A refundable tax credit means
that if you do not owe any tax, you can receive the credit amount in the form of a refund.
States may also offer their own version of refundable credits in addition to the federal
government’s portion (State Tax Credits, 2016). The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and the

Child Dependent Care Tax Credit (CDCTC) are both refundable credits states have the option of
offering. States that offer their own versions of one or both refundable credits may be more
likely to favor welfare.
On the other hand, some may argue states offer their own version of the EITC and
CDCTC to reduce the number of families who need assistance. This is because the credits are
work incentivizing, meaning the more a person works, the more they will receive up to a
predetermined amount. While tax credits may incentivize work and therefore reduce the need
for welfare, it should be pointed out that families may receive both. Tax credits are excluded
from countable income for TANF eligibility purposes (Department of Public Health and Human
Services, 2018). Therefore, providing a refundable portion of the EITC and CDCTC does not
necessarily reduce the number of welfare recipients.
Overall, states’ attitudes toward welfare and some barriers that are put up cannot be
directly measured. States that demonstrate a willingness to help low income families in other
ways may be those that reduce these difficult to measure barriers. Examining different factors
such as a state’s party affiliation and views on tax credits may shed light into states’ views on
welfare.
METHODOLOGY
Description of Data
There are nine variables in this model, one dependent variable and eight independent
variables. This model consists of fifty observations taken from 2018 state-level data. The
dependent variable is the TANF-to-poverty ratio (TPR) by state. This ratio reveals what
percentage of poor children that are receiving TANF benefits per state. It is calculated by

dividing the amount of TANF cash assistance families by the number of families with children in
poverty. This dependent variable was used, as the goal of this project is to identify factors that
impact TANF’s reach to needy families by state.
Most of the independent variables are qualitative factors, therefore, several dummy
variables are used. Dummy variables are set equal to 0 or 1, representing the absence or presence
of a qualitative variable.
One of the dummy variables used is an Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) variable. If a
state offered a refundable tax credit to complement the federal EITC credit, the state would
receive a 1. On the other hand, if the state only offered the federal EITC credit and no state
version of the credit, the state would receive a 0. I predict the EITC dummy to have a positive
effect on the TPR because it suggests the state favors progressive policies. Therefore, I expect
the TPR to increase if a state has an EITC refundable credit, causing a positive effect.
The Child Dependent Care Tax Credit (CDCTC) variable is similar to the EITC dummy.
The state received a 1 if it offered a refundable tax credit to complement the federal CDCTC
credit. On the other hand, if the state only offered the federal CDCTC credit and no state version
of the credit, the state would receive a 0. I predict the CDCTC dummy to have a positive effect
on the TPR because states that attempt to help working families through this manner may be
more liberal with other polices as well. Therefore, I expect the TPR to increase if a state has a
CDCTC refundable credit, causing a positive effect.
A value of 1 for the diversion program variable indicates the state offers a program(s) to
redirect applicants applying for TANF. A 0 means the state does not have an alternative program
to divert the applicant to. I predict a negative coefficient on the diversion program variable

because it makes it harder for people to qualify for benefits. Therefore, I expect TPR to decrease,
as states implement diversion programs, causing a negative effect.
The political affiliation variable identifies whether a state’s majority party enrollment is
Democrat. States that had the majority party enrollment as democratic were given a 1, whereas,
all other states where given a 0. I predict a positive coefficient on the political affiliation
variables because it suggests the state favors welfare. Therefore, I expect TPR to increase, if a
state votes majority democratic, causing a positive effect.
The school requirement variable means a state requires a qualifying child to be enrolled
in school full-time. States that do not have this requirement were given a 1, whereas, states that
required children to be enrolled full-time received a 0. I predict a positive coefficient on this
school requirement because not having it makes it easier to maintain eligibility. Therefore, I
expect TPR to increase if a state does not require a qualifying child to be enrolled in school fulltime, causing a positive effect.
The immunization requirement variable means that a parent must keep up with the
qualifying child’s immunization records to maintain eligibility. States that do not have this
requirement were given a 1, whereas, states that required children to keep up with immunization
records received a 0. I predict a positive coefficient on this school requirement because not
having it makes it easier to maintain eligibility. Therefore, I expect TPR to increase if a state
does not require a qualifying child to keep up with immunization records, causing a positive
effect. Not only do variables such as school and immunization requirements directly measure
obstacles, they indirectly measure attitudes as well.

In addition to the multiple dummy variables, there were two quantitative independent
variables in this model. One is the maximum eligibility limits variable. This variable reveals the
most amount of money a family of 3 can earn in each state before being ineligible for TANF
benefits. I predict a positive effect because more people will qualify with higher limits.
Therefore, I expect as the maximum eligibility limits increase, so will the TPR, causing a
positive effect.
The last variable used in this model is the maximum monthly benefit. This variable
displays the highest potential benefit a family of three can earn, based on where they live. I
predict a positive coefficient because more people will choose welfare if it pays more.
Furthermore, higher benefits may suggest less strict policies, meaning that this variable could
also be picking up on states’ attitudes on welfare. Therefore, I expect as the maximum monthly
benefit increases, so will the TPR, causing a positive effect.
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Number of Observations= 50
TANF to Poverty Ratio
Max Eligibility Limits (dollars)*
Max Monthly Benefit (dollars)*

Mean Median
20.8
20.1
880.8
839.5
469.1
452.0

St. Dev. Minimum
13.74
3.9
435.61
0.0
191.12
170.0

Dummy Variables %= 1
Dummy=1 if the state offers a refundable Earned Income Tax Credit
Dummy=1 if the state offers a refundable Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit
Dummy=1 if the state offers a Diversion Program
Dummy=1 if the state is considered a Democratic state
Dummy=1 if the state does not require children to be enrolled in school full-time
Dummy=1 if the state has no immunization requirements for children
*For a family of three

Maximum
65.3
2227.0
1039.0
40%
50%
40%
60%
30%
50%

Table 1 exhibits the summary statics for this model’s variables. This data shows that
California's TPR, 65.3, is 16.5 times greater than Louisiana's TPR, which is only 4. On average,

states have a TPR of 20.1. This data also reveals that Wisconsin's income limits are extremely
low, $0, compared to Minnesota who allows families of three to have $2,227. On average, states
allow families of three to earn $880.80.
In addition, half of the states offer a refundable CDCTC, while only 40% of states offer
their own portion of EITC. A majority of states require qualifying children to be enrolled in
school full-time, while only half require them to keep up with their immunization records.
There was one high outlier in the data, California's TPR which was more than three
standard deviations from the mean. To fix this problem an outlier dummy variable was created
and reran the regression. This data did not have any missing variables.
To test for Multicollinearity, I ran a correlation test on STATA with all the independent
variables. As Figure 1 exhibits, none of the independent variables were highly correlated with
each other.
Figure 1: Testing for Multicollinearity

I ran a modified White’s test and Breusch-Pagan test to determine if the model had any
heteroskedasticity. The results displayed in Figures 2 and 3 show p-values greater than 10
percent, allowing the conclusion heteroskedasticity is not present in the model.

Figure 2: Testing for Heteroskedasticity

Results
The model had an adjusted R2 of 65.5 percent, meaning 65.5 percent of the variation in
TANF-to-poverty ratio is explained by the variation of the independent variables. The overall
significance of the model is significant because the significance F was equal to 0.0000000146,
which means at least one variable is significantly affecting the TANF-to-poverty ratio.
Table 2: Ordinary Least Squared Estimates
Dependent Variable: TANF-to-poverty Ratio
Independent Variable
Intercept
Max Eligibility Limit
Max Monthly Benefit
EITC
CDCTC
Diversion Program
Majority Democrat
No School Requirement
No Immunization requirement
a. Significant at 1%
b. Significant at 5%
c. Significant at 10%

Coefficient
-1.330
0.004
0.024a
0.507
6.569b
-5.558b
6.184c
6.143c
0.296

P-value
0.711
0.198
0.008
0.863
0.013
0.035
0.056
0.082
0.929

Table 2 reveals one variable is statistically significant at a confidence level of 1%, and
two variables are statically significant 5% and two at 10%. There are three statistically
insignificant variables in this model.
The variable on maximum monthly benefits is statistically significant at 1 percent. There
was a positive coefficient for maximum monthly benefit concurrent to my prediction. Therefore,
as the maximum monthly benefit increases by $1, the predicted TANF-to-poverty ratio increases
by 0.024 families per 100, holding all other independent variables constant. For example, New
Hampshire with a maximum monthly benefit of $1,039 would be predicted to help 28 more
families, per 100, than Mississippi with a maximum monthly benefit of $170.
The CDCTC variable is statistically significant at 5%. A positive coefficient on the
CDCTC variable was predicted and this turned out to be the case. Despite the positive
association, CDCTC is still a work incentivizing credit. As the dependent variable is the
percentage of the poor receiving TANF, this variable may also be measuring the attitudes of the
states. Therefore, if a state offers a refundable portion of the CDCTC, the predicted TANF-topoverty ratio increases by 6.569 families per 100, holding all other independent variables
constant.
The diversion program is statistically significant at 5 percent. This variable had a
negative coefficient as predicted. This means if the state offers a diversion program, the
predicted TANF-to-poverty ratio decreases by 5.558 families per 100, holding all other
independent variables constant.
The party affiliation variable is statistically significant at 10%. This variable has a
positive effect as predicted. If a state identifies as a democratic state, the predicted TANF-to-

poverty ratio increases by 6.184 families per 100, holding all other independent variables
constant.
Another variable statistically significant at 10 percent is the school requirement variable.
This variable has a positive coefficient as predicted. If the state does not require children to be
enrolled in school full-time, the predicted TANF-to-poverty ratio increases by 6.143 families per
100, holding all other independent variables constant.
There were three variables that were not statistically significant. The first variable that
was not statistically significant was the maximum eligibility limit variable. The next variable that
was not statistically significant was the EITC dummy variable. Finally, the immunization
requirement variable was not statistically significant.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Increasing Monthly Benefit
Numerous studies indicate that income matters for a child. Financial stability will help a
child grow up healthy and provide opportunities to thrive (Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities, 2019). Yet, 1 in 5 children live in households below the poverty line. Furthermore,
even those receiving TANF benefits are struggling. TANF benefits in every state leave families
at or below the 60 percent poverty level (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2019).
According to the results of this study, as the maximum monthly benefit increase, so does
the TANF-to-poverty ratio. Therefore, states should increase their maximum monthly benefit
levels in order to help more needy families. This is because more people would be willing to go
through the welfare process if they believed it was worth it. As of right now, the benefits are not
enough to help families make ends meet. A paper states “TANF families often find themselves in

poor housing conditions with few resources to pay for even a modest apartment” (Center on
Budget and Policy Priorities, 2019, p.11).
Diversion Programs
According to the results in this paper, formal diversion programs are negatively
associated with state’s TANF-to-poverty ratios. This begs the question are diversion programs a
good alternative to TANF that helps achieve the overall goal of assisting needy families? If so,
should more states implement formal diversion programs as an attempt to reach more needy
families? Examining relevant literature will help evaluate whether implementing diversion
programs will be a useful policy recommendation.
Diversion programs were created during PRWORA as a strategy to reduce an ongoing
need for welfare. PRWORA did not set any guidelines regarding diversion programs, resulting in
TANF applicants getting diverted at various times of the process and in different ways (ASPE,
2016). Some applicants are diverted to support services, others get resource referrals, and some
get help finding a job (Congressional Research Service, 2001). The numerous forms of diversion
programs and the lack of guidelines surrounding them makes it difficult to measure how many
applicants are diverted. Moreover, there are no requirement to report and/or measure how many
applicants are diverted, resulting in very few studies regarding diversion programs.
This paper focused solely on formal diversion programs, which provide families with
lump sum cash payments (Goehring, et al, 2018). All the studies discussed will be based off
formal diversion programs only.
One study reveals that a small number of diverted applicants apply for TANF shortly
after receiving diversion assistance. According to the report, “only about 20% of diversion
program participants enrolled in the TANF program within 12 to 18 months of receiving

diversion assistance” (Congressional Research Service, 2001, p.13). This may suggest that
diversion programs successfully help those in need, as they are not going right back for more
help.
On the other hand, another study found that around 500,000 to 1,000,000 people were
diverted from TANF, missing out on cash assistance and important services they were eligible
for (Zedlewski, 2002). Furthermore, another article stated that “diverting from TANF, relative to
enrolling in and leaving the program, is associated with lower rates of employment and higher
rates of Food Stamp program participation” (London, 2003, p.5). This may suggest that perhaps
this short-term assistance is not enough for families.
Another article discusses that diversion programs may lead to families accepting
lumpsum payments rather than TANF due to not fully weighting the consequences of the
decision. Afterall, enrolling in diversion programs are optionally to families and they do not have
to accept if they choose not to. Being persuaded into accepting a diversion payment, rather than
thinking it through, may cause the family to need even more assistance in the long-term
(London, 2003).
All-in-all, there is limited work regarding the effect diversion programs have on needy
families. One study suggests that few return for help shortly after receiving diversion assistance,
while other studies suggest it may only cause need for long-term help. Overall, due to the lack of
studies and data on TANF diversion programs, it would best that it becomes mandatory to report
everyone being diverted. In addition, there be stricter guidelines regarded diversion programs.
This would allow more studies which can help determine if diversion programs are a good
alternative and more states should implement them, or if they are a bad alternative and states
should reconsider implementing them.

Reducing Poverty
The last recommendation is to continue funding programs that reduce poverty. This
would be beneficial as the number of needy families would decrease. One way to do this is by
increasing the funding for the federal EITC. According to Marr (2017), the EITC lifted 9.4
million people out of poverty in 2013, including 5 million children. Additionally, the EITC credit
helped 22 million other people become less poor (Marr, Huang, Sherman, & Debot, 2017). This
would help increase state’s TPR because the number of poor families would decrease.
CONCLUSION
Overall, all families in need should be able to get access to assistance, regardless of
where they live. According to this study, states that offer their own refundable CDCTC, have
higher maximum monthly benefits, majority enrolls as Democratic, and do not have
immunization requirements, have higher TANF-to-poverty ratios. Furthermore, states that offer
diversion programs have lower TANF-to-poverty ratios. To make TANF’s reach more
consistent, states should increase their maximum monthly benefit. There should also be
regulations regarding diversion programs to help determine if they are good or bad for needy
families. Lastly, the federal government should continue to support programs like the EITC to
help reduce poverty.
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